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Abstract. We describe two constructions of non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) systems in
the public index setting, both having ciphertexts and secret keys of constant size. Both schemes are
obtained by tweaking the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption system (Crypto 2005) and are
proved selectively secure without random oracles under previously considered assumptions in groups
with a bilinear map. Our first realization builds on prime-order bilinear groups and is proved secure
under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption, which is parameterized by the
length n of vectors over which the inner product is defined. By moving to composite order bilinear
groups, we are able to obtain security under static subgroup decision assumptions following the De´ja`
Q framework of Chase and Meiklejohn (Eurocrypt 2014) and its extension by Wee (TCC 2016). Our
schemes are the first NIPE systems to achieve such parameters, even in the selective security setting.
Moreover, they are the first proposals to feature optimally short private keys, which only consist of
one group element. Our prime-order-group realization is also the first one with a deterministic key
generation mechanism.
Keywords. Functional encryption, non-zero inner products, (identity-based) revocation.
1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [36, 21] allows fine-grained access control to encrypted data. In
an ABE system, a ciphertext has an associated attribute ~x and a secret key for a user associated
to some attribute ~y can successfully decrypt iff some relation R on ~x, ~y holds true i.e., R(~x, ~y) = 1.
An ABE scheme is said to be secure if a collusion attack by a group of users does not compromise
the security of a ciphertext they are not allowed to decrypt. In this work, we consider attributes
belonging to some inner product space V and the relation is given by R(~x, ~y) = 1 iff 〈~x, ~y〉 6= 0,
for ~x, ~y ∈ V . Such an ABE (referred to as non-zero inner product encryption scheme or NIPE) is
known to imply identity-based revocation, an important cryptographic primitive in its own right.
Identity-based revocation (IBR) allows a sender to encrypt and broadcast a message to a number
of identities, given a set of revoked users R, so that only secret keys associated with identities
outside of R can decrypt the message. NIPE systems are known to imply IBR – the attribute
associated with the ciphertext (of length n) is nothing but the vector of coefficients of the polynomial
pR(Z) =
∏
idi∈R(Z − idi) where |R| ≤ n and the secret key for an identity id corresponds to the
vector (1, id, . . . , idn). The inner product is non-zero if and only if pR(id) 6= 0 or equivalently id /∈ R,
in which case decryption succeeds.
In this paper, our main goal is to design NIPE (and thus revocation) schemes that simultaneously
provide short ciphertexts and private keys. We will also seek to prove security under well-studied
hardness assumptions.
Our Contribution. We first present a NIPE system employing prime-order bilinear groups where
ciphertexts and secret keys both have constant3 size. Our scheme is the first one where both sizes can
be constant. Indeed, all earlier realizations [5, 4, 35] providing O(1)-size ciphertexts (resp. O(1)-size
private keys) indeed required O(n) group elements in private keys (resp. in ciphertexts), where n
denotes the dimension of the inner product space which is fixed at setup time. Even in the selective
model [5, 4], all previous constructions thus had linear complexities in the size of ciphertexts or
private keys.
The scheme is also the first NIPE realization to feature optimally short private keys – which only
consist of onz group element – via a deterministic private key extraction algorithm. In particular,
our NIPE scheme implies the first (identity-based) revocation system that simultaneously provides
O(1)-size ciphertexts and private keys. It thus performs in the same way as the Boneh-Gentry-
Waters (BGW) broadcast encryption [13] system and relies on the same assumption. Like earlier
NIPE proposals, our scheme requiresO(n) group elements in the public parameters. In the broadcast
revocation setting, this translates into a linear public key size in the maximal number of revoked
users per ciphertext, which is on par with existing solutions [39, 30] based on the Naor-Pinkas
technique [30].
The security of our scheme is proved against selective adversaries under the n-Decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (n-DBDHE) assumption, the strength of which depends on the dimension n of
handled vectors. While relying on such a parameterized assumption is certainly a caveat [18], our
scheme can be modified so as to dispense with variable-size assumptions.
Our second contribution is a NIPE system based on composite order pairing groups with security
under constant-size subgroup decision assumptions. The proof follows the De´ja` Q framework of [17,
41]. Even in the restrictive selective model of security, our scheme is the first one to achieve constant
size ciphertexts and keys under static assumptions.
In the context of revocation, not only do we provide the first identity-based revocation systems
with constant-size ciphertexts and keys, but we also give a solution based on fairly well-studied
subgroup assumptions in composite order groups. It remains a challenging open problem (at least
without using a complexity leveraging argument [9] entailing an exponential security loss) to achieve
similar efficiency tradeoffs while proving security against adaptive adversaries.
Outline of the constructions and proofs. We begin with the first construction based on an asym-
metric prime-order pairing e : G× Gˆ→ GT with group prder p. The public key consists of gαi , gˆαi
for i ∈ [1, 2n] \ {n + 1} along with gγ where g and α, γ are sampled at random from G and Zp,
respectively. In addition the element e(g, gˆ)α
n+1
is provided. A ciphertext for an attribute vector
~x ∈ Znp and message m consists of (m ·e(g, gˆ)α
n+1s, gs, (v ·g
∑n
i=1 α
ixi)s). Secret key associated with a
vector ~y is computed deterministically as gˆγ
∑n
i=1 α
n−i+1yi . The structure is reminiscent of the Boneh-
Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption scheme [13]. The proof is a reduction from the hardness of the
n-DBDHE problem – an instance consists of gα
i
, gˆα
i
for i ∈ [1, 2n] \ {n + 1}, gs ∈ G, T ∈ GT and
asks to decide whether T = e(g, gˆ)α
n+1s or T R← GT . The attacker declares a target vector ~x∗ which
is used to program γ =
∑n
i=1 α
ix∗i . For any ~y ∈ Znp with 〈~x∗, ~y〉 = 0, secret keys can be simulated
using the elements provided in the instance because the coefficient of αn+1 in the exponent of gˆ
3 One may object saying the linear-length vector ~x still has to be appended to the ciphertext. Nevertheless, in many
applications the description of ~x can be very short. For example, in an ordinary (i.e., non-identity-based) broadcast
encryption scheme for n users, ~x is uniquely determined by the n-bit word that specifies which users are in the
revoked set. In this case, our ciphertexts reduce the communication overhead from O(nλ) to O(n+ λ) bits if λ is
the security parameter.
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would be 〈~x∗, ~y〉 which is zero. The challenge T is embedded in the first component of the challenge
ciphertext.
We then consider a variant in the setting of a composite-order symmetric pairing e : G×G→ GT
of common group order N = p1p2p3, similar to Wee’s composite-order variant [41] of the broadcast
encryption in [13]. (Let Gq denote the subgroup of G of order q where q would be of the form
pe11 p
e2
2 p
e3
3 for e1, e2, e3 ∈ {0, 1}). The public key is composed of v = gγ , (gα
i
)ni=1, Uj = u
αj , j ∈
[1, 2n] \ {n+ 1} for some g, u R← G and α, γ ∈ ZN along with a pairwise-independent hash function
H : GT → {0, 1}λ. Decryption key for a vector ~y is defined as uγ
∑n
i=1 α
n−i+1yi and the ciphertext
for attribute ~x and message M is defined as (M ⊕H(e(g, u)αn+1s), gs, (v · g
∑n
i=1 α
ixi)s). In addition,
the parameters Uj and secret keys are randomized with Gp3-components. The security is reduced
to two standard subgroup decision assumptions, denoted (p1 → p1p2) and (p1p3 → p1p2p3), where
(q1 → q2) subgroup decision problem asks to distinguish between random elements of Gq1 from
random elements of Gq2 . The reduction gradually adds Gp2-components to the challenge ciphertext
as well as elements (Uj)
2n
j=1 so that at the end, each Uj has in its exponent a pseudorandom function
RF : [1, 2n] → Zp2 evaluated at j. The element v = gγ is programmed based on the challenge
attribute ~x∗ in a manner similar to the reduction in the prime-order case. Additionally, this ensures
that the challenge ciphertext components are independent of α mod p2. Given this and the fact
that keys are generated only for vectors ~y with 〈~x∗, ~y〉 = 0, αn+1 does not appear in the exponent
of u in any of the keys. On the other hand, the message is masked by the hash of an element of
GT determined by RF (n + 1). Since all information provided to the attacker is independent of
RF (n + 1), we use the left over hash lemma to argue that the mask on the message is uniformly
distributed and hence statistically hides the message from the attacker.
Related Work. The inner product functionality was first considered by Katz, Sahai and Waters
[23] in the design of predicate encryption systems (i.e., ABE schemes in the private index setting).
Their construction [23] initiated a large body of work [31, 37, 34, 2, 25, 32–35] which considered
hierarchical extensions [31, 34], additional properties in the secret-key setting [37] and adaptively
secure realizations [25, 32–35].
In the public-index setting, inner products also proved useful [4] to build adaptively secure
identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) and revocation schemes with short ciphertexts under
simple assumptions. The first construction of non-zero IPE appeared in [4] with security in the co-
selective model under the Decision Linear [10] and Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumptions.
Co-selective security requires an adversary to commit to the attributes corresponding to private
key queries before seeing the public parameters of the scheme, as opposed to target attribute set in
the selective model. It is slightly stronger than the selective model but weaker than the adaptive
model. The scheme has constant-size ciphertexts whereas its public parameters and keys are of size
linear in n. More efficient realizations (but with asymptotically similar parameters) were put forth
by Attrapadung et al. [5] and Yamada et al. [42] under the n-DBDHE assumption. While some of
the NIPE constructions of [5, 42] have exactly the same ciphertext length (resp. private key length)
as our scheme, they require O(n)-size private keys (resp. O(n)-size ciphertexts). We thus prove
security under the same assumption as [5, 42] with only one group element per private key and 3
group elements per ciphertext.
The first adaptively secure NIPE scheme was proposed in [35] with O(n) group elements in the
public parameters and either O(1)-size ciphertexts or O(1)-size keys with a security reduction to the
Decision Linear assumption. A more efficient construction was provided in [16] via an instantiation
of predicate encodings [40] in prime-order groups. On the other hand, either ciphertexts or secret
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keys had size linear in n. Previously known constructions did not consider simultaneously achieving
constant size ciphertexts and secret keys.
More recently, Abdalla et al. [1] suggested a different inner product functionality which evaluates
linear functions of encrypted data (i.e., their inner product with a vector associated with the private
key), instead of only testing if they evaluate to 0 as in [23, 25, 32–35]. Under simple assumptions,
they obtained practical solutions based on the standard Decision Diffie-Hellman and Learning-With-
Errors assumptions. Their results were extended to handle adaptive adversaries [3] and function-
privacy in the secret-key setting [7].
In the context of IBBE scheme, Delerable´e [19] suggested a selectively secure construction with
constant-size ciphertexts and private keys based on strong q-type assumptions. Her construction
actually remains the most efficient IBBE in the literature to date. The IBR system implied by
our first NIPE construction can be seen as the revocation analogue of Delerable´e’s IBBE as it
simultaneously provides O(1)-size ciphertexts and keys (the public parameters also have linear
length in the maximal number of receivers per ciphertext in [19]). Unlike our IBR system, however,
[19] is not known to have a counterpart based on simple assumptions in composite order groups.
In the identity-based revocation setting, the constructions of Lewko, Sahai and Waters [24] feature
constant-size private keys and public parameters, but their ciphertext size is linear in the number
of revoked users. While their first construction has very short private keys and public parameters
(made of 3 and 4 group elements, respectively), its underlying complexity assumption is very ad
hoc and even stronger than n-DBDHE.
The De´ja` Q framework, introduced by Chase and Meiklejohn [17], allows reducing well-studied
fixed-size assumptions, such as the Subgroup Decision assumption [12] to some families of parame-
terized assumptions in composite-order groups. As a result, some well-known constructions such as
Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF [20] and Boneh-Boyen signatures [8], when instantiated in composite order
groups, could be shown secure under subgroup decision assumptions. Wee [41] further advanced the
framework to cover certain encryption primitives as well, in addition to removing the restriction to
work with asymmetric composite order groups. The primitives include adaptively secure identity-
based encryption and selectively secure broadcast encryption. Recently, Libert et al. [27] applied
Wee’s framework to obtain functional commitment schemes for linear functions and accumulators
from simple assumptions.
2 Background
2.1 Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
Assumptions in prime order groups. Let (G, Gˆ,GT ) be cyclic groups of prime order p with
a bilinear map e : G × Gˆ → GT . We rely on a parameterized assumption which was introduced
by Boneh, Gentry and Waters [13]. While this assumption was originally defined using symmetric
pairings [11, 13], we consider a natural extension to asymmetric pairings, which will enable our
most efficient construction.
Definition 1. Let (G, Gˆ,GT ) be asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order p. The n-Decision
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (n-DBDHE) problem is, given
(g, gα, g(α
2), . . . , g(α
n), g(α
n+2), . . . , g(α
2n), h, gˆ, gˆα, gˆ(α
2), . . . , gˆ(α
n), gˆ(α
n+2), T )
where α R← Zp, g, h R← G, gˆ R← Gˆ and T ∈R GT , to decide if T = e(h, gˆ)(αn+1) or if T is a random
element of GT .
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Assumptions in composite order groups. We use groups (G,GT ) of composite order N =
p1p2p3 endowed with an efficiently computable map (a.k.a. pairing) e : G×G→ GT such that: (1)
e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G × G and a, b ∈ Z; (2) if e(g, h) = 1GT for each h ∈ G, then
g = 1G. An important property of composite order groups is that pairing two elements of order pi
and pj , with i 6= j, always gives the identity element 1GT .
In the following, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote by Gpi the subgroup of order pi. For all distinct
i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we call Gpipj the subgroup of order pipj . In this setting, we rely on the following
assumptions introduced in [26].
Assumption 1 Given a description of (G,GT , e) as well as g R← Gp1 , g3 R← Gp3 and T ∈ G, it is
infeasible to efficiently decide if T ∈ Gp1p2 or T ∈ Gp1 .
Assumption 2 Let g,X1
R← Gp1 , X2, Y2 R← Gp2 , g3, Y3 R← Gp3 . Given a description of (G,GT , e), a
set of group elements (g,X1X2, g3, Y2Y3) and T , it is hard to decide if T ∈R Gp1p3 or T ∈R G.
These assumptions are non-interactive and falsifiable [29]. Moreover, in both of them, the number
of input elements is constant (i.e., independent of the number of adversarial queries).
2.2 Non-Zero Inner Product Encryption (IPE)
Definition 2 (NIPE). Let V denote an inner product space of dimension n and M denote the
message space. A non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) scheme for inner products over V , is
defined by four probabilistic algorithms – Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen and Decrypt.
Setup(λ, n): Takes as input a security parameter λ and the dimension of V . It outputs the public
parameters mpk and the master secret msk.
KeyGen(msk, ~y): On input a vector ~y ∈ V and the master secret msk; this algorithm outputs a
secret key d~y for ~y.
Encrypt(mpk,m, ~x): Takes as input a message m and an attribute vector ~x ∈ V and outputs a
ciphertext C.
Decrypt(mpk, C, d~y): If 〈~x, ~y〉 6= 0, this algorithm returns the message m and ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. A NIPE scheme satisfies the correctness condition if for all vectors ~x, ~y ∈ V with
〈~x, ~y〉 6= 0 and for any message m ∈ M, any keys (mpk,msk) ← Setup(λ, n), d~y ← KeyGen(msk, ~y)
and any ciphertext C ← Encrypt(mpk,m, ~x), then Pr[m = Decrypt(mpk, C, d~y)] = 1.
Definition 3 (Selective Security). Selective security of a non-zero inner product encryption
scheme is formalized in terms of the following game between an adversary A and a challenger.
Initialization: The adversary A declares a challenge vector ~x?.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm of the NIPE and gives the public parameters to
the adversary A.
Key Extraction Phase 1: The adversary makes a number of key extraction queries adaptively.
For a query on a vector ~y with the restriction that 〈~x?, ~y〉 = 0, the challenger responds with a private
key d~y for ~y.
Challenge: The adversary A provides two equal-length messages M0,M1. The challenger chooses
a bit β uniformly at random from {0, 1}, encrypts Mβ to ~x? and returns the resulting ciphertext C?
to the adversary A.
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Key Extraction Phase 2: A makes more key extraction queries under the same restriction that
it can only query a key for any vector ~y with 〈~x?, ~y〉 = 0.
Guess: A outputs a bit β′.
If β = β′, then A wins the game. The advantage of A in winning the above game is defined as
AdvNIPE,A(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β = β′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The NIPE scheme is said to be secure if every PPT adversary has negligible advantage in winning
the above game.
3 A Construction for Non-Zero Inner Products with Constant-Size
Ciphertexts and Private Keys
Our scheme builds on the Boneh-Gentry-Waters broadcast encryption [13] and inherits its efficiency.
In particular, the public parameters are exactly those of the BGW construction. In order to adapt it
in the context of non-zero inner product encryption, we extend earlier observations which leveraged
the BGW technique in the design of accumulators [14] and vector commitments [28, 22].
It was shown in [22] that a public key of the form {(gi = g(αi), gˆi = gˆ(αi))}i∈[1,2n]\{n+1} allows
committing to a vector ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) in such a way that the commitment string C = g
γ ·∏nj=1 gxjj
makes it possible to convincingly reveal the partial information z = 〈~x, ~y〉 about the committed
message ~x. Namely, a single group element
Wz =
n∏
i=1,i 6=j
(gˆγn+1−i
n∏
j=1
gˆ
xj
n+1+j−i)
yi ∈ Gˆ (1)
can serve as a witness that z = 〈~x, ~y〉, for public ~x ∈ Znp and z ∈ Zp, and the verifier accepts (z,Wz)
if and only if the following relation holds:
e(C,
n∏
j=1
gˆ
yj
n+1−j) = e(g1, gˆn)
z · e(g,Wz) (2)
The binding property of the commitment scheme relies on the fact that neither gn+1 = g
(αn+1) nor
gˆn+1 = gˆ
(αn+1) is publicly available.
Our non-zero IPE scheme proceeds by randomizing both members of (2) – by raising them to a
random power s ∈ Zp – so that the randomized C can be embedded in the ciphertext (together with
gs) while Wz serves as a decryption token. The decryption operation then computes e(g1, gˆn)
s·〈~x,~y〉,
which uncovers e(g1, gˆn)
s whenever 〈~x, ~y〉 6= 0.
In our scheme, ciphertexts are of the form (C0, C1, C2) =
(
M · e(g1, gˆn)s, gs, (gγ ·
∏n
j=1 g
xj
j )
s
)
and the challenge is thus to associate each vector ~y ∈ Zp with a short private key d~y so as to enable
decryption. To achieve this, we observe that (1) can be re-written as
Wz = (
∏
i=1
gˆyin+1−i)
γ ·
n∏
i=1,i 6=j
n∏
j=1
gˆ
xjyi
n+1+j−i ∈ Gˆ,
where the second term is publicly computable as it does not depend on gˆn+1 = gˆ
(αn+1). This implies
that, if γ ∈ Zp is the master secret key, the private key for a vector ~y can only consist of a single
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group element d~y = (
∏n
j=1 gˆ
yj
n+1−j)
γ ∈ Gˆ.
Somewhat surprisingly, private keys are generated in a deterministic manner and, at first glance,
their shape seems at odds with the collusion-resistance requirement: if d~y1 is a private key for ~y1 ∈ Zp
and d~y2 is a private key for ~y2 ∈ Zp, the product d~y1 ·d~y2 is a valid private key for ~y1 +~y2. However,
this does not affect the NIPE functionality since any ciphertext that neither d~y1 nor d~y2 can decrypt
must be labeled with a vector ~x such that 〈~x, ~y1〉 = 〈~x, ~y2〉 = 0, which implies 〈~x, ~y1 + ~y2〉 = 0. Said
otherwise, combining several keys that cannot decrypt a given ciphertext only yields another key
that remains unable to decrypt.
Setup(λ, n): Choose bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ and define the bilinear map
e. Choose g R← G, gˆ R← Gˆ, α, γ R← Zp at random in order to define v = gγ ∈ G and
g1 = g
α, . . . gn = g
(αn)
gn+2 = g
(αn+2), . . . g2n = g
(α2n)
and
gˆ1 = gˆ
α, . . . gˆn = gˆ
(αn)
gˆn+2 = gˆ
(αn+2), . . . gˆ2n = gˆ
(α2n)
Define the master public key to consist of
mpk :=
(
(G, Gˆ,GT , e), g, gˆ, v, {(gj , gˆj)}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1}
)
.
The master secret key is msk := γ.
KeyGen(msk, ~y): To generate a key for the vector ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Znp , compute and output
d~y =
( n∏
i=1
gˆyin+1−i
)γ ∈ Gˆ.
Encrypt(mpk, ~x,M): To encrypt M ∈ GT under ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Znp , choose s R← Zp in order to
compute and output
C = (C0, C1, C2) =
(
M · e(g1, gˆn)s, gs, (v ·
n∏
j=1
g
xj
j )
s
)
.
Decrypt(mpk, C, ~x, d~y, ~y): Given a ciphertext C labeled with ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Znp and a private
key d~y associated with the vector ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Znp , return ⊥ if ~x·~y = 0. Otherwise, conduct
the following steps.
1. Compute
Aˆi =
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
gˆ
xj
n+1+j−i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (3)
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2. Compute and output
M = C0 ·
(e(C1, d~y ·∏ni=1 Aˆyii )
e(C2,
∏n
i=1 gˆ
yi
n+1−i)
)1/(~x·~y)
. (4)
The correctness of the scheme is easily verified by observing that
e
(
g, (
∏n
i=1 gˆ
yi
n+1−i)
γ ·∏ni=1∏nj=1,j 6=i gˆxjyin+1−i+j)
e
(
gγ ·∏nj=1 gxjj ,∏ni=1 gˆyin+1−i)
=
e
(
g, (
∏n
i=1 gˆ
yi
n+1−i)
γ ·∏ni=1∏nj=1,j 6=i gˆxjyin+1−i+j)
e(gγ ·∏nj=1 gˆyin+1−i) · e(g,∏ni=1∏nj=1 gxjyin+1−i+j) = e(g, gˆn+1)−
∑n
i=1 xiyi . (5)
By raising both members of (5) to the power s ∈ Zp and using (3), we obtain the equality
e(C1, d~y ·
n∏
i=1
Aˆyii )/e(C2,
n∏
i=1
gˆyin+1−i) = e(g1, gˆn)
−s·〈~x,~y〉,
which explains why M can be computed as per (4) whenever ~x · ~y 6= 0.
From an efficiency point of view, the receiver has to compute a product of only two pairings
(which is faster than two individual pairing evaluations) while the encryption and decryption algo-
rithms both require at most O(n) exponentiations. Indeed, the value d~y ·
∏n
i=1 Aˆ
yi
i is computable
via a multi-exponentiation involving 2n−1 base elements (rather than n2 in a naive computation).
Theorem 1. The scheme is selectively secure under the n-DBDHE assumption.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let A be a PPT adversary with non-negligible advantage ε in
the selective security game. We build a reduction algorithm that takes as input ((G, Gˆ,GT , e), g, h,
{(gi, gˆi) = (g(αi), gˆ(αi))}i∈[1,2n]\{n+1}, T ) and uses A to decide if T = e(h, gˆ)(αn+1) or T ∈R GT .
The adversary A first chooses a target vector ~x? = (x?1, . . . , x?n) ∈ Znp . To construct the master
public key mpk, B chooses γ˜ R← Zp and computes
v = gγ˜ ·
n∏
j=1
g
−x?j
j ∈ G,
which implicitly defines the master secret key msk to be γ = γ˜ −∑nj=1 xj · αj . The adversary A is
run on input of
mpk :=
(
g, gˆ, v, {(gi, gˆi) = (g(αi), gˆ(αi))}i∈[1,2n]\{n+1}
)
.
Observe that mpk is distributed as in the real scheme as v is uniformly distributed over G. At any
time, A can request a private key d~y for any vector ~y ∈ ZNp such that ~x · ~y = 0. To generate the
private key
d~y =
( n∏
i=1
gˆyin+1−i
)γ ∈ Gˆ,
algorithm B can exploit the fact that, in the product,( n∑
i=1
yi · αn+1−i
) · ( n∑
j=1
x?j · αj
)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x?j · yi · αn+1−i+j ,
8
the coefficient of αn+1 is exactly 〈~x?, ~y〉, which must be zero in any legal private key query ~y ∈ Znp .
Specifically, B can compute
d~y =
( n∏
i=1
gˆyin+1−i
)γ˜
/
n∏
i=1
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
gˆ
x?j ·yi
n+1−i+j . (6)
For any vector ~y ∈ Znp such that 〈~x?, ~y〉 = 0, B can thus compute the private key d~y as per (6).
In the challenge phase, A chooses messages M0,M1 ∈ GT and expects to receive an encryption
of one of these. At this point, B flips a fair coin β R← {0, 1} and computes
C = (C0, C1, C2) =
(
Mβ · T, h, hγ˜
)
,
which is returned as a challenge to B. It is easy to see that, if T = e(h, gˆ)(αn+1), then C is a valid
encryption of Mβ for the vector ~x
? = (x?1, . . . , x
?
n) and the encryption exponent s = logg(h). In
contrast, if T ∈R GT , the ciphertext carries no information about β ∈ {0, 1}.
When A halts, it outputs a bit β′ ∈ {0, 1}. If β′ = β, the reduction B outputs 1 (meaning that
T = e(h, gˆ)(α
n+1)). Otherwise, it outputs 0. uunionsq
4 NIPE from Constant-Size Subgroup Assumptions
In this section, we present a non-zero inner-product encryption (NIPE) scheme based on composite
order pairings e : G×G→ GT of common group orderN = p1p2p3, with security under the subgroup
decision assumptions. For inner products over length-n vectors in ZN , the public parameter size is
linear in n while ciphertexts and keys have constant size (independent of n). The resulting scheme
is the first to achieve such parameters with selective security under constant size assumptions.
Similar to the prime-order case, it seems possible to derive this construction from a functional
commitment scheme for linear functions [27] by randomizing commitments and the verification
equation. However, the transformation is not generic. A commitment C to a message ~x ∈ ZnN in
[27] is computed as C = gγ · g
∑n
i=1 α
i·xi . Elements
(
gγ , {gαi}ni=1
)
are made available in the public
parameters along with elements Uj = u
αj · R3,j for j ∈ [1, 2n] \ {n + 1} with R3,j being randomly
distributed in Gp3 . The Uj ’s allow creating a short witness Wz for the statement z = 〈~x, ~y〉 (for
some ~y ∈ ZnN ) using the secret random exponent γ.
Wz =
n∏
i=1
W yii , where Wi = U
γ
n−i+1
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
Un+1+j−i.
Consolidating all the terms that depend on γ into Wz,1, write Wz = Wz,1 ·Wz,2. More precisely, we
have
Wz,1 =
n∏
i=1
Uγn−i+1 and Wz,2 =
n∏
i=1
 n∏
j=1,j 6=i
Un+1+j−i
yi .
Observe that the computation of Wz,2 is solely based on information available in the public pa-
rameters and Wz,1 is independent of ~x. One can verify the validity of the witness Wz by simply
checking whether the following equation holds.
e(C,
n∏
i=1
Uyii ) = e(g
α, Un)
z · e(g,Wz).
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Randomizing both sides of the above equation with s ∈ ZN in the exponent leads us to the non-
zero IPE. Namely, a ciphertext for a vector ~x and a message M ∈ {0, 1}λ would consist of Cs, gs
and M ⊕ H(e(gα, Un)s), where H : GT → {0, 1}λ is a pairwise-independent hash function. The
decryption key for a vector ~y is nothing but Wz,1. For a valid key, the fact that z = 〈~x, ~y〉 6= 0
enables us to recover the blinding factor on the message from e(gα, Un)
zs.
Setup(λ, n): Takes as input n, the dimension of the inner product space. Choose bilinear groups
(G,GT ) of composite order N = p1p2p3, where pi > 2l(λ) for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for a suitable
polynomial l : N → N. Define the bilinear map e : G × G → GT . We consider inner products
defined over ZnN . Choose g, u
R← Gp1 , R3 R← Gp3 and α, γ R← ZN at random in order to define
G1 = g
α, G2 = g
(α2), . . . , Gn = g
(αn)
and
U1 = u
α ·R3,1, U2 = u(α2) ·R3,2, . . . , Un = u(αn) ·R3,n
Un+2 = u
(αn+2) ·R3,n+2, . . . , U2n = u(α2n) ·R3,2n,
where R3,j
R← Gp3 for each j ∈ [1, 2n]\{n+ 1}. Define the public parameters to consist of
mpk :=
(
(G,GT , e), g, gγ , {Gj}nj=1, {Uj}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1}, H
)
,
where H : GT → {0, 1}λ is a pairwise-independent hash function. The master secret key is given
by msk := (u,R3, γ, α).
Encrypt(mpk,M, ~x = (x1, . . . , xn)): To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1}λ under ~x ∈ ZnN , choose s R← ZN and
define the ciphertext C to consist of three components – one from GT and two from G given by
C0 = M ⊕ H(e(g, u)αn+1s), C1 = gs, C2 = gs·(γ+
∑n
i=1 α
i·xi),
where C0 and C2 are computed as M ⊕ H
(
e(G1, Un)
s
)
and (gγ ·∏ni=1Gxii )s, respectively. The
algorithm outputs C = (C0, C1, C2).
KeyGen(msk, ~y): The secret key for ~y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ZnN is given by
d~y =
(
n∏
i=1
uα
i·yi
)γ
·X3,
where X3
R← Gp3 is sampled using R3.
Decrypt(C, ~x, ~y, d~y): Let w = 〈~x, ~y〉 mod N . If w 6= 0 the algorithm computesAi =
∏n
j=1,j 6=i U
xj
n+1+j−i
for all i ∈ [1, n], and recovers M ∈ {0, 1}λ as
M = C0 ⊕ H
((
e(C1, d~y ·
∏n
i=1A
yi
i )
e(C2,
∏n
i=1 U
yi
n−i+1)
)1/w)
.
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Correctness. Correctness follows from the observation that
e(C2, Un−i+1) = e
(
gs·(γ+
∑n
i=1 α
ixi), u(α
n−i+1) ·R3,n+2
)
= e
(
gγ ·
n∏
i=1
Gxii , u
(αn−i+1)
)s
= e
(
gγ ·
n∏
i=1
gα
i·xi , u(α
n−i+1)
)s
= e(g, u)α
n+1·s·xi · e
g, uγn−i+1 · n∏
j=1,j 6=i
uα
n+1+j−i·xj
s
= e(g, u)α
n+1·s·xi · e (g, uγn−i+1 ·Ai)s .
Raising both sides of the above equality to yi and taking a product over all i ∈ [1, n] gives us
e
(
C2,
n∏
i=1
Uyin−i+1
)
=
n∏
i=1
e(g, u)α
n+1·s·xi·yi ·
n∏
i=1
e
(
g, u(α
n−i+1)·γ ·Ai
)s·yi
= e(g, u)α
n+1·s·〈~x,~y〉 · e
(
gs,
n∏
i=1
u(α
n−i+1)·γ·yi ·Ayii
)
= e(g, u)α
n+1·s·w · e
(
C1, d~y ·
n∏
i=1
Ayii
)
,
as required. Note that in the last step, we replaced
∏n
i=1 u
(αn−i+1)·γ·yi by d~y as the Gp3 component
vanishes upon pairing.
Theorem 2. The NIPE construction is selectively secure if Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
Proof. The proof relies on a series of modifications to the distribution of public parameters. To
define these alternative distributions, we use a family of functions
{Fk : [1, 2n]→ Zp2}2nk=0
such that for all j ∈ [1, 2n],
Fk(j) =
{
0 if k = 0∑k
i=1 rj · αji mod p2 if k ∈ [1, 2n]
where r1, . . . , r2n, α1, . . . , α2n are randomly distributed in Zp2 . The modified distributions are de-
fined on the parameters {Uj}2nj=1.
Type k parameters (0 ≤ k ≤ 2n): are parameters where elements {Ui}i∈[1,2n] have a Gp2 com-
ponent determined by the function Fk(.): namely,
Ui = u
(αi) · gFk(i)2 ·R3,i ∀i ∈ [1, 2n].
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The proof proceeds through a sequence of 2n+ 4 games denoted G0, G1, G2, G3,1, . . . ,G3,2n, G4 as
defined below. Let win denote the event that the adversary A wins in game G.
Game G0: is the real attack game (described in Section 2.2).
Game G1: This game is similar to G0 except for the following changes. At the beginning of the
game, the challenger chooses γ˜ R← ZN and sets γ = γ˜ −
∑n
i=1 α
ix?i where ~x
? = (x?1, . . . , x
?
n) is
the challenge vector. The public parameter gγ is generated as gγ˜ ·∏ni=1G−x?ii . The challenge
ciphertext is computed as:
C1
R← Gp1 , C2 = C γ˜1 , C0 = Mβ ⊕ H
(
e(C1, Un+1)
)
.
Since γ is known to the challenger, secret key queries can be answered by running the KeyGen
algorithm. The change is only conceptual and hence Pr[win0] = Pr[win1].
Game G2: In this game, we start modifying the distribution of the challenge ciphertext. Namely,
the challenger now picks C1 uniformly at random in Gp1p2 instead of Gp1 . The adversary’s ability
to distinguish between games G1 and G2 can be leveraged to break Assumption 1 as formalized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then |Pr[win1]− Pr[win2]| is negligible.
Game G3,k for k = 1, . . . , 2n: We let game G3,0 be identical to G2 for notational convenience. In
game G3,k the adversary is given Type k parameters. We argue that the adversary can detect
this change with negligible probability if Assumption 2 holds.
Lemma 2. If Assumption 2 holds, then the distance |Pr[win3,k−1]−Pr[win3,k]| is negligible for
each k ∈ [1, 2n].
In game G3,2n the parameters Uj have their Gp2 components defined by F2n(j), which is a 2n-
wise independent function from [1, 2n] to Zp2 . The adversary’s view thus remains identical if we
replace the function F2n by a truly random function RF : [1, 2n] → Zp2 which allows defining the
Gp2 component of Uj as g
RF (j)
2 for each j ∈ [1, 2n].
Game G4: This game is identical to game G3,2n with the difference that, in the challenge ciphertext,
C0 is chosen as a random string in {0, 1}λ. We argue that any legitimate adversary’s view remains
statistically close to that of game G3,2n. To see this, we first note that the Gp2 components of the
secret keys contain linear combinations of RF (j) in the exponent excluding RF (n+ 1). Indeed,
recall that the adversary can only make private key queries on vectors ~y such that 〈~y, ~x?〉 = 0.
Programming γ as γ = γ˜ −∑ni=1 αi · x?i requires the creation of a Gp1 component with the
exponent (
n∑
i=1
yi · αn−i+1
)
·
(
γ˜ −
n∑
i=1
αi · x?i
)
,
in order to generate a secret key for ~y. Note that the coefficient of αn+1 is 〈~y, ~x?〉 which is 0 for
all legal private key queries. Hence, the private key d~y can be computed without using Un+1,
ensuring that RF (n+ 1) remains completely independent of any information revealed to A. As
a result, the distribution of
H
(
e(C1, Un+1)
)
= H
(
e(C1, u
αn+1) · e(C1, gRF (n+1)2 )
)
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is statistically uniform over {0, 1}λ as long as C1 as a non-trivial Gp2 component (which occurs
with probability 1− 1/p2). This follows from the fact that, if e(C1, g2) 6= 1GT , the Gp2 compo-
nent of e(C1, g
RF (n+1)
2 ) has log(p2) bits of min-entropy. Since H : GT → {0, 1}λ is a pairwise-
independent hash function, the Leftover Hash Lemma ensures that, conditionally on the adver-
sary’s view, the distribution of H
(
e(C1, u
αn+1) ·e(C1, gRF (n+1)2 )
)
is within distance 2−λ from the
uniform distribution over {0, 1}λ. This implies that |Pr[win3,2n]−Pr[win4]| ≤ 1/p2+1/2λ, which
is statistically negligible as claimed. Since β ∈ {0, 1} is perfectly hidden from the adversary in
G4, we have Pr[win4] = 1/2.
Combining the above, we find
AdvNIPE,A(λ) = |Pr[win0]− Pr[win4]|
≤ Adv1G,B(λ) + 2n · Adv2G,B(λ) +
1
p2
+
1
2λ
which is negligible in the security parameter λ provided Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 both hold
in (G,GT ). uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 1). Let (g, g3, T ) be an instance of Assumption 1. We show how B simulates the
different stages of the security game.
Initialize: A commits to the challenge vector ~x? = (x?1, . . . , x?n).
Setup: Pick u R← Gp1 , α R← ZN and compute Gj = gα
j
for j = 1, . . . , n, Uj = u
αj ·R3,j for j ∈ [1, 2n]
where R3,j ’s are sampled from Gp3 using g3. Choose γ˜
R← ZN and set γ = γ˜ −
∑n
i=1 α
i · x?i . The
adversary is given the following public parameters
mpk :=
(
g, gγ , {Gj}nj=1, {Uj}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1}, H
)
.
Key Extraction: Upon a query on vector ~y ∈ ZnN , the adversary is given d~y =
(
u
∑n
i=1 α
n−i+1·yi
)γ ·
X3, where X3
R← Gp3 .
Challenge: A provides two messages M0,M1. B picks β R← {0, 1} and computes the ciphertext
C? = (C0, C1, C2), where,
C1 = T, C2 = T
γ˜ , C0 = Mβ ⊕ H
(
e(C1, Un+1)
)
.
Guess: A returns a bit β′. B returns 1 if β = β′ and 0 otherwise.
If T R← Gp1 , then C? is distributed as in G1. Otherwise, T R← Gp1p2 and B simulates G2. We have
|Pr[win1]− Pr[win2]| = |Pr[β = β′|T R← Gp1 ]− Pr[β = β′|T R← Gp1p2 ]|
= |Pr[B returns 1|T R← Gp1 ]− Pr[B returns 1|T R← Gp1p2 ]|
= Adv1G,B(λ) ,
which is negligible under Assumption 1. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 2). Using A show how to construct an algorithm B that breaks Assumption 2.
B receives an instance (g,X1X2, g3, Y2Y3, T ) of the problem and simulates the game as follows.
Suppose that T = u · gr22 · gr33 where either r2 = 0 or r2 R← Zp2 .
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Initialize: A commits to the challenge vector ~x? = (x?1, . . . , x?n).
Setup: Pick α R← ZN , r′1, . . . , r′k−1 R← ZN and compute Gj = gα
j
for j = 1, . . . , n and
Uj = T
αj · (Y2Y3)
∑k−1
i=1 r
′
i·αji ·R′3,j
for j ∈ [1, 2n] where R′3,j R← Gp3 . Choose γ˜ R← ZN and set γ = γ˜ −
∑n
i=1 α
ix?i . The adversary is
given the following public parameters
mpk :=
(
g, gγ , {Gj}nj=1, {Uj}j∈[1,2n]\{n+1}, H
)
.
Key Extraction: Upon a query on vector ~y ∈ ZnN , the adversary is given d~y =
(∏n
i=1 U
yi
n−i+1
)γ ·X ′3,
where X ′3
R← Gp3 .
Challenge: A provides two messages M0,M1. B picks β R← {0, 1} and computes the ciphertext
C? = (C0, C1, C2), where,
C1 = X1X2, C2 = (X1X2)
γ˜ , C0 = Mβ ⊕ H
(
e(C1, Un+1)
)
.
Guess: A returns a bit β′. B returns 1 if β = β′ and 0 otherwise.
If r2 = 0, then the parameters have the Type k − 1 distribution. Otherwise, r2 R← Zp2 and the
parameters have the Type k distribution for reasons explained next. The Gp2-components of Uj
(for j ∈ [1, 2n]) would be given by
gr2·α
j
2 · Y
∑k−1
i=1 ri·αji
2 . (7)
All the information provided to A is independent of α mod p2 (by the Chinese Remainder Theorem)
and hence we can substitute α mod p2 with a uniformly random αk ∈ Zp2 . The Gp2 component of
Uj in (7) can thus be replaced by
g
∑k
i=1 ri·αji
2 .
as required. Moreover, the Gp3 component of Uj is uniformly distributed since we randomize it by
R′3,j . We thus have
|Pr[win3,k−1]− Pr[win3,k]| ≤ Adv2G,B(λ),
which is negligible under Assumption 2. uunionsq
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